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“Some paintings become famous because, being durable, they are 
viewed by successive generations, in each of which are likely to be 
found a few appreciative eyes.  I know a painting so evanescent that 
it is seldom viewed at all, except by some wandering deer.  It is a 
river who wields the brush, and it is the same river who, before I can 
bring my friends to view his work, erases it forever from human 
view.  After that it exists only in my mind’s eye.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, environmental pollution has spawned a great 
deal of public and private litigation and related governmental 
investigations.  One type of claim, however, has seen little 
contemporary litigation: claims for natural resource damages 
(“NRD”).  The relative dearth of NRD claims being pursued is 
unusual given the breadth of available legal theories and the 
compelling public interest at stake.  The goal of this article is to 
explain the importance of NRD programs and evaluate the process of 
bringing and defending NRD claims in the United States. 
A strong NRD program benefits society in many diverse ways.  
Economic enhancement and increased protection for environmental, 
recreational, and historical interests are but a few examples2.  A U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Service article espoused the benefits of a strong NRD 
program: 
NRDAR [Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration 
Program] ensures healthy fish and wildlife populations, as well as 
healthy lands and waters on which they depend.  NRDAR ensures 
healthy wetlands, which support more species of wildlife than any 
other habitat type.  Wetlands are especially important to 
commercial saltwater fish and shellfish.  Wetlands benefit people by 
providing recreational opportunities, recharging groundwater 
supplies, reducing flood damage, and controlling erosion.  The 
economic benefits of wetland resources are estimated at more than 
$1 trillion annually.  NRDAR benefits the nation’s 35 million 
anglers, 14 million hunters, and 63 million wildlife viewers who rely 
on healthy fish and wildlife populations for their outdoor pursuits.  
NRDAR helps maintain a thriving economy by ensuring healthy 
 
 1. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 93 (Oxford University Press ed., 2001) 
(1949). 
 2. See generally New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Natural Resource 
Restoration, http://www.nj.gov/dep/nrr (last visited Sept. 4, 2006). 
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resources that provide recreational opportunities.  Fishing annually 
brings in $38 billion; hunting, $21 billion; and wildlife viewing, $27 
billion. These earnings represent about 1.4% of the Gross 
Domestic Product.  NRDAR helps safeguard more than 2 million 
full- and part-time jobs related to fishing, hunting, and wildlife 
viewing.  NRDAR benefits a nearly $4 billion dollar per year 
commercial fishing industry. 3 
In addition, property owners and other real estate interests 
adjacent to restored areas benefit by removing stigmas that lower 
property values, promoting economic development and enhancing the 
use and enjoyment of property.  The establishment of new natural 
resources, such as habitats for certain species, might create more 
development opportunities in other areas over time.  Healthy natural 
resources are also important to Native American Tribes and help to 
maintain “their sovereign rights to land, water, fishing, hunting, and 
gathering, as well as cultural, spiritual, and traditional activities that 
depend on healthy resources.”4  For all Americans, there remains a 
strong desire to leave things better for the next generation. 
The overriding public interest in the preservation and 
reclamation of natural resources is one of the most important reasons 
for the development of NRD programs.  As the nature of the public 
interest in natural resources has evolved, so has environmental 
legislation.  The focus of the first significant environmental laws in the 
1950s and 1960s was significantly different than the present day focus 
of environmental legislation.  Initially, environmental efforts were 
prompted by preservationist ideals - the desire to maintain the 
“great” natural resources and save such sites from exploitation.  For 
example, in the 1960s, the proposed construction of a dam in the 
Grand Canyon raised awareness about environmental protectionism - 
the need to preserve the legacy of our nation’s natural resources.5  
Legislation was directed primarily at the behavior of government 
agencies, as opposed to private individuals.6  Congress enacted 
environmental legislation to “ensure that government agencies 
respected social and cultural values when pursuing development 
 
 3. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, BEYOND CLEANUP: : RESTORING AMERICA’S 
NATURAL HERITAGE 2 (Jan. 1, 1998), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/contaminants/Documents/beyond_cleanup.pdf.. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Richard L. Berkman & W. Kip Viscusi, Damming The West: Ralph Nader’s Study 
Group Report on the Bureau of Reclamation 75 (1973). 
 6. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary 
Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1158 (1995). 
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projects,”7 rather than to address the illegal conduct of polluters and 
the consequences of their actions. 
In effect, we have begun to move from a “great places” approach 
to natural resources to a “reclaiming” approach.  While a few “great 
place” battles still continue, such as the effort to preserve the Arctic 
Wilderness, today environmental activism and legislation is inspired 
by the need to restore and prevent further exploitation of injured and 
diminishing natural resources such as the nation’s coastal areas.  
Environmentalism is motivated less by the need for preservation and 
more by the desire for reclamation.  People now understand two 
things about natural resources.  First, natural resources can be 
salvaged, even in seemingly impossible industrial and urban locales.  
The technology and the capacity to reclaim and recreate natural 
resources have improved exponentially and will continue to improve.  
The Meadowlands in New Jersey is a classic example of this type of 
transformation potential.8  Second, people take property rights more 
seriously and also understand that the public’s right to its property or 
“commons” is important for both monetary and nonmonetary 
reasons.9  Natural resources that were formerly viewed with little 
interest or real understanding, such as groundwater, have generated a 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. At one time the world’s largest dump 
“[t]he Hackensack Meadowlands is perhaps the largest urban wetland complex in the 
northeastern United States.  It lies along the Hackensack River and is located within 
the New York-Newark metropolitan area.  Given this location, the Meadowlands has 
been greatly impacted by urban and port development . . . . The New Jersey 
Meadowlands Commission (“NJMC”) is acquiring wetlands and management rights 
and making zoning changes . . . in an effort to protect the remaining wetlands.  Plans 
are underway to restore the Hackensack Meadowlands ecosystem . . . . Wetland 
restoration and enhancement efforts include restoring tidal flow, removing 
contaminated soils, creating open water areas, controlling invasive species . . . and 
regulating water levels . . . . The main hope for the future of Meadowlands wetlands as 
well as for other urban wetlands is that as many as possible will be set aside as open 
space for our benefit and for future generations and that wetland restoration efforts 
will be accelerated to revitalize significantly impacted wetlands and to rebuild lost 
wetlands wherever practicable.  Wetlands are natural resources that, among other 
things, increase the quality of life for urban residents across America. 
“RALPH W. TINER, JOHN Q. SWORDS, & BOBBI JO MCLAIN, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, 
WETLAND STATUS AND TRENDS FOR THE HACKENSACK MEADOWLANDS 1, 27 (Dec. 2002), 
available at http://library.fws.gov/Wetlands/Hackensack.pdf. 
 9. See Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae and the Attorney General 
as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 94-96 (Fall 
2005).  Historically, the public “common” was a public area used by villagers for livestock 
grazing.  Additionally, the villagers had the right to “cut wood, to fish, and to cut peat or turf for 
fuel.”  Id. at 64.  The common area was used and regulated by the villagers for purposes of 
mutual sustainability and benefit. 
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special need for attention in light of the crucial role they will play in 
the future of this country’s survival.10 
The enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Compensation, Response and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA” or 
“Superfund”)11 was an attempt by Congress to respond to the massive 
pollution and contamination of the environment in the United States.  
However, as the past twenty-five years have demonstrated, CERCLA 
has not been effective in enabling the recovery of damages for 
pollution and restoring injured natural resources.12  In fact, CERCLA 
has actually enabled polluters to prolong any meaningful cleanup of 
natural resources by permitting them to engage in years of ineffective 
and mostly useless remediation and feasibility studies.13  Moreover, 
the response time of CERCLA is poor, thus prolonging what is 
already a tediously slow road to restoration.14 
The pursuit of NRD is the last chance to accomplish what the 
United States originally wanted to do with Superfund - to cleanup the 
nation’s natural resources and make the polluters compensate both 
the government and the public for the injuries that they have suffered 
and will continue to endure.  Because our natural resources are being 
destroyed and are disappearing at an alarming rate, NRD litigation 
has become increasingly important to preserve these natural assets 
for the public and for future generations. 
II.  BRINGING AN NRD CLAIM 
A. Who is the Proper Party to File Suit? 
When an injured natural resource is privately owned, property 
laws dictate that the owner of that natural resource is entitled to file 
suit and recover damages from a potentially responsible party 
(“PRP”).15  In the United States, the Constitution, statutes, and 
common law protect private property rights.  However, when natural 
resources owned by the public are damaged, questions arise as to who 
is entitled to sue for damages on behalf of the public, and of the type 
 
 10. See id. at 83. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000). 
 12. See generally Allan Kanner, Rethinking Superfund, 20 NAT’L ASS’N ENVTL. PROF’S 
News 19 (May-June 1995). 
 13. See Robert W. McGee, Superfund: It’s Time for Repeal After a Decade of Failure, 12 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 165, 170 (1993). 
 14. Id. at 168-69. 
 15. See generally 42 U.S.C.§ 9607 (2000). 
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of behavior constituting permissible use of public property.  For 
example, an individual’s right to operate a polluting facility on his 
private property must be balanced with the public’s right to have a 
river adjacent to the property free from contamination.  Ultimately, it 
is the governmental trustees who have both the responsibility and the 
affirmative obligation to protect natural resources held in trust for the 
benefit of the public and to decide when and how to do so. 
Natural resource trustees’ responsibilities include assessing the 
extent of injury to natural resources and restoring natural 
resources.  In order to execute these responsibilities, a trustee can 
negotiate with PRPs to obtain PRP-financed or PRP-conducted 
assessment and restoration of natural resource injury, sue PRPs for 
the costs of assessing and restoring the natural resource, or conduct 
the assessment and restore natural resources and then seek 
reimbursement from PRPs, and, in limited circumstances, from 
Superfund.16 
Both the federal and state governments are responsible for protecting 
and maintaining the natural resources that fall within their respective 
jurisdictions.17 
1. State Trustees 
Traditionally, states have had the responsibility of protecting 
natural resources for the benefit of the public.  A state may use the 
common law public trust doctrine and police power authority to bring 
suit to recover damages for injured natural resources and to restore 
the same.18  These common law doctrines evolved in recognition of 
the inherently broad authority states have over natural resources 
within their boundaries.  For example, in Georgia v. Tennessee 
Copper Co., Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that “the state has 
an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all 
the earth and air within its domain.  It has the last word as to whether 
its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall 
breathe pure air.”19  Accordingly, as the Supreme Court later noted, a 
state may assert a claim to protect “the atmosphere, the water, and 
 
 16. Allan Kanner, Tribal Sovereignty and Natural Resource Damages, 25 PUB. LAND & 
RESOURCES L. REV. 93, 107 (2004). 
 17. In some cases, these rights have been passed to citizens under appropriate 
circumstances, such as with a federal citizen’s suit pursuant to a state statute in New Jersey’s 
Environmental Rights Act.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-1-35A-14 (2000).’’ 
 18. See Kanner, supra note 9, at 88-89. 
 19. 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 
592, 604 (1982). 
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the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of 
the private owners of the land most immediately concerned.”20 
States exercise police power for the protection of public health 
and welfare pursuant to the powers reserved to states by the Tenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.21  Through its police 
power a state may regulate the release of contaminants into the air,22 
protect the quality of water,23 control land use through zoning 
regulations,24 regulate storage and disposal of solid and hazardous 
substances,25 and protect the public interest in wildlife.26 
 
 20. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). 
 21. Similarly, the common law theory of parens patriae is illustrative of states’ power and 
authority to protect the interests of its citizens.  Through parens patriae suits, states have sought 
redress for injuries to “quasi-sovereign” interests.  These “quasi-sovereign” interests include 
state interest in its general economy or environment, Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 56 (1890); interstate water management, 
Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494, 509 (1932); pollution-free interstate waters, Missouri v. 
Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); protection of the air and earth from interstate pollutants, 
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907); and the general economy of the state, 
Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945), rev’g denied, 324 U.S. 890 (1945). 
 22. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 49-401(A) (1987); Nw. Laundry v. City of Des Moines,  
239 U.S. 486, 494-95 (1916); State v. Burns, 591 P.2d 563, 566 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Lees v. Bay 
Area Air Pollution Control Dist., 48 Cal. Rptr. 295, 299-300 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (holding 
that the regulation of air pollution is “essential and represents a lawful and proper exercise of 
the police power”). 
 23. See, e.g., Morshead v. Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., 119 Cal. Rptr. 586, 589 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (holding that “prevention of water pollution is a legitimate government 
objective in furtherance of which the police power may be exercised”); Commonwealth v. 
Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 885 (Pa. 1974) (“abatement of water pollution is 
unquestionably a reasonable exercise of the police power in the abstract”); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. 
Commonwealth, 334 A.2d 790, 796 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975). 
 24. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 277 P.2d 45, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (“[z]oning is inherent 
in the police power”); Johnson v. Village of Villa Park, 18 N.E.2d 887, 889 (Ill. 1938) (“Cities 
and villages have the right to adopt zoning ordinances as an exercise of their police power and 
thereby impose a reasonable restraint upon the use of private property.”); Roselle v. Wright, 
122 A.2d 506, 510 (N.J. 1956). 
 25. See, e.g., State v. Byrd, 708 So. 2d 401, 405 (La. 1998); Dep’t of Transp. v. PSC Res., 
Inc., 419 A.2d 1151, 1158-59 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980); Meyers v. Town of Cornwall, 192 
N.Y.S.2d 734, 738 (N.Y. 1959) (“a municipality may, in the exercise of its police power, adopt an 
ordinance which regulates the collection, storage or disposition of refuse and garbage”). 
 26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-101(1) (2006) (“It is the policy of the state of Colorado that 
the wildlife and their environment are to be protected, preserved, enhanced, and managed for 
the use, benefit, and enjoyment of the people of this state and its visitors.”); People v. K. Sakai 
Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 536, 539 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Fla. Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm’n v. 
Flotilla, Inc., 636 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Stewart, 253 S.E.2d 638, 640 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (“As the State’s wildlife population is a natural resource of the State held 
by it in trust for its citizens, the enactment of laws reasonably related to the protection of such 
wildlife constitutes a valid exercise of the police power vested in the General Assembly.”) 
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The public trust doctrine has its origins in ancient common law.27  
During its early development in American jurisprudence, the doctrine 
was used to retain fisheries and land under navigable waters in trust 
for the use and benefit of the public.28  The public trust doctrine was 
first applied in case law pertaining to disputes over navigable waters.  
These cases began with the premise that navigable beds, critical to 
commerce, were owned by the state and held in common by the state 
for public use.  In the early American case of Home v. Richards,29 the 
court held that the bed of a navigable river within the Commonwealth 
could not be granted to an individual.30  The general scope of the 
doctrine is well articulated in the seminal United States Supreme 
Court case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois: 
That the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable 
waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner that 
the state holds title to soils under tide water, by common law, we 
have already shown; . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the 
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters . . . and have 
liberty of fishing therein . . . The trust devolving upon the state for 
the public, and which can only be discharged by the management 
and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot 
be relinquished by a transfer of the property.  The control of the 
state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost . . . 31 
Although the public trust began with a more limited focus during 
an era of relatively weak environmental understanding, the trend 
over time has been to expand protection to an equally broad array of 
natural resources.  Since the doctrine’s first application to navigable 
beds, whose import to commerce is obvious, it has been extended to 
 
 27. See Kanner, supra note 9, at 62. 
 28. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970); see also V. YANNACONE, B. COHEN & S. 
DAVIDSON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 1, § 2:3 (1972). 
 29. 8 Va. (4 Call) 441, 449-50 (Va. 1798). 
 30. Over the years, because the doctrine was used in relation to waterways, some confusion 
arose about the public trust and its relation to riparians.  See, e.g., Taylor v.  Commonwealth, 47 
S.E. 875, 882 (Va. 1904) (reconciling rights of the riparian with public rights); Groner v. Foster, 
27 S.E. 493, 494 (Va. 1897) (emphasizing rights of riparians in navigable waters); 
Commonwealth v. Garner, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 624, 655 (Va. 1846) (noting that navigable streams 
were the property of the Commonwealth, held for the public benefit).  Nonetheless, the 
principle that government has a proprietary interest in natural resources survived.  See, e.g., 
Geer v.  Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1986) (noting the state’s regulatory authority over wild 
game), overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979); Toomer v. 
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (weighing the rights to shrimp in territorial waters). 
 31. 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892) (emphasis added). 
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include state trusteeship over natural resources32 with little or no 
commercial value, such as non-navigable waters33 and state parks.34  
Additionally, although the public trust doctrine speaks in terms of 
duties and not NRD, the nexus between resources that are recognized 
as being held in trust by the state is their importance to the general 
public, aesthetically as well as commercially.  This importance 
supersedes the natural resources’ potential value from exploitation by 
any one individual.  More recent cases have recognized that the trust 
is active, not passive, and imposes a responsibility on states to 
preserve and promote the trust corpus.35  Thus, a pattern has emerged 
in which states are directed to take a more proactive approach to 
fulfill their obligations and responsibilities with regard to the 
protection of natural resources. 
Recognizing that the state has an important interest in 
conserving and protecting natural resources, the doctrine of parens 
patriae allows the state (in its capacity as “trustee”) to bring suit to 
protect those natural resources.  This type of suit, recognized in many 
states,36 allows the trustee (state) to sue to make the trust (natural 
resources) whole, whether by means of restoration or compensation.  
Despite the fact that many states have no case law directly addressing 
a state’s parens patriae authority to sue, there is no evidence that any 
state has deemed the principle of parens patriae not to be a part of the 
state’s law.  Furthermore, many state constitutions, such as 
 
 32. The legal fiction of state ownership of natural resources was abandoned in Hughes as 
being inconsistent with the Commerce Clause; however, the Supreme Court in that case 
recognized the important interest at stake.  The Supreme Court stated, “We consider the States’ 
interests in conservation and protection of wild animals as legitimate local purposes similar to 
the States’ interests in protecting the health and safety of their citizens.”  Hughes, 441 U.S. at 
337. 
 33. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Ca. 1983), cert  denied, 
464 U.S. 977 (1983). 
 34. See Sax, supra note 28, at 485; Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234, 238-39 (8th Cir. 
1899); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Mass. 1966). 
 35. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 726-27; City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N.W. 
820, 832 (Wis. 1927). 
 36. See, e.g., Maine v.  M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (D. Me. 1973); Dep’t of 
Natural Res. v. Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (D. Md. 1972); California v. S.S. 
Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp.  922, 925 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.  v. Jersey Cent. 
Power & Light Co., 336 A.2d 750, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 
351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976); State v. Bowling Green, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ohio 1974); Dep’t of 
Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 766-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). 
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Louisiana’s, impose upon the state a duty to protect the 
environment.37 
A somewhat analogous common law doctrine available to 
redress NRD is the doctrine of public nuisance.  Public nuisance is 
defined as “an unreasonable interference with the rights common to 
the general public;” it is “a significant interference with the public 
health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort or the 
public convenience  . . . “38  Moreover, it is not necessary that an 
individual actually be harmed.39  Monetary damages for public 
nuisance, however, are not available.40  Depending on the jurisdiction, 
public nuisance may be statutorily defined, but nonetheless may be 
available at common law.41 
In a sense, the public trust doctrine and the public nuisance 
doctrine operate under the same principle.  Both protect interests of 
the public in natural resources.  The public trust doctrine protects 
natural resources held for all.  Public nuisance protects those held by 
no one.  In the case of United States v. Luce, the United States, as 
operator of a quarantine station for immigrants waiting to enter the 
country, brought a public nuisance action against a neighboring fish 
factory. 42  The government sought an injunction against the factory to 
abate foul smells that were making the quarantined individuals sick.43  
The court granted relief, enjoining the nuisance, in spite of the 
equitable right of the defendant.44 
From this case, one can see the interaction of the public trust 
doctrine and public nuisance claims and their applicability to NRD 
regarding the ability to file suit.  In Luce, the court recognized that 
the United States had a responsibility to alleviate nuisances affecting 
 
 37. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; see also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4; 
PA. CONST. art I, § 27. 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979) 
 39. See Chicago v. Gunning  Sys., 73 N.E. 1035, 1040-41 (Ill. 1905) (holding that the fact 
that landowners had not been injured is not a defense). 
 40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821C cmt. a, (1979). 
 41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871, 880 (Pa. 1974).  The 
State of Pennsylvania brought an action in equity to require the owner of closed mine to treat 
acid mine drainage that was discharging from the mine.  The state asserted claims based on 
statutory and common law public nuisance.  The court held that “[t]he third and fourth based 
upon which the Commonwealth claims relief should be granted are the doctrines of statutory 
and common law public nuisances.  We find that relief may be granted under either of these 
theories.”  Id. 
 42. 141 F. 385, 390 (C.C.D. Del. 1905). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 422-23. 
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the enjoyment of life of quarantined individuals under its care.45  This 
responsibility is analogous to the responsibility of the government to 
protect natural resources which are held under its care for the 
common good.  The Luce court also allowed the government to sue 
prospectively to stop an activity that was harming those under its 
care.46  Similarly, the government should be able to sue prospectively 
to protect natural resources under its care from damage, or, if the 
damage has already occurred, to sue on behalf of the trust to recover 
compensation for injury. 
2. Federal Trustees 
Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, as first discussed by the 
United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Waddell, “when the 
[r]evolution took place, the people of each state became themselves 
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their 
navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common 
use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to 
the general government.”47  On the contrary, there is no inherent right 
held by the federal government to act as trustee over natural 
resources.  Historically, to pursue NRD, the federal government has 
been limited to actions permitted by legislative mandates that confer 
upon it trustee status over natural resources.48  Despite this fact, the 
federal government has managed to carve out a significant role as 
trustee in the pursuit of NRD claims. 
A variety of environmental laws confer trustee status upon the 
federal government and its agencies.  CERCLA,49 the Oil Pollution 
Act (“OPA”)50 and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)51 all permit the 
designation of both federal and state trustees to pursue NRD claims.  
The statutes do not identify specific trustees; however, particular 
trustees may be designated by other means.  For example, Executive 
Order 1258052 and the amendment53 thereto designate certain federal 
trustees to implement CERCLA, including the Departments and 
 
 45. Id. at 389. 
 46. Id. at 422-23. 
 47. 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842). 
 48. Laura Rowley, NRD Trustees: To What Extent Are They Truly Trustees?, 28 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 459 (2001). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2) (2000). 
 50. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(b) (2000). 
 51. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (2000). 
 52. Exec. Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923, 2923-24 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
 53. Exec. Order No. 13016, 61 Fed. Reg. 45871 (Aug. 28, 1996). 
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Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice, Interior, Agriculture, 
Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Transportation, 
Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency.54 
One of the biggest problems associated with federal trustees is 
that they are not bound by any specific rules or principles requiring 
them to balance public interests - a fact that can give rise to actions by 
federal trustees that are inconsistent with the fiduciary nature of 
trusteeship.  “Instead of holding federal statutory NRD trustees to a 
strict fiduciary duty, courts have granted them agency deference.”55  
Such inconsistency with principles of trusteeship and fiduciary duties 
is evidenced in cases where the trustee does not spend all monies 
recovered for NRD to restore or recreate the injured natural 
resource.56  While a trustee’s decision to not spend any monies 
recovered on the restoration of the damaged natural resource clearly 
violates the duties imposed upon federal agents as trustees, the most 
minimal restoration efforts seem to “satisfy” a trustee’s fiduciary duty 
despite the fact that the natural resource remains polluted.57  As a 
result, the public, as the beneficiary of the trust, is deprived of the full 
use and benefit of the natural resource and is left with no other 
recourse since damages have already been recovered for the natural 
resource’s injury. 
3. Overlapping Authority 
Since federal trusteeship is derived from a number of 
overlapping federal statutes, more than one federal trustee will likely 
be involved at a given site, and overlaps with state and Indian tribe 
trustees frequently occur as well.  The Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”), which amended CERCLA, 
requires the EPA to notify trustees of possible natural resource 
impacts and to coordinate its investigatory work with the trustees.58  
Despite this fact, an initial obstacle in the pursuit of NRD is the 
 
 54. See also Trustees for Natural Resources, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.600-300.615 (2005). 
 55. Rowley, supra note 48, at 486. 
 56. “The best example of the futility in trying to identify where an NRD trustee has 
violated the bounds of the statutory authority, and thus violated its fiduciary duty, is found in 
the case of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.  The Spill Trustee Council recovered nine hundred 
million dollars from the settlement of a suit under the CERCLA and CWA NRD provisions.  
Due to the magnitude of the disaster, the Spill Trustee Council used the money for a variety of 
purposes, but it is unclear whether all the uses were for the end result of natural resource 
restoration.”  Id. at 487 (footnotes omitted). 
 57. Id. at 486. 
 58. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(2) (2000). 
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coordination of trustee activities at a given site and the determination 
of which trustee, if any, will be the lead. 
The construction of federal environmental laws seems to indicate 
that particular natural resources are the responsibility of the federal 
government and other natural resources fall within the ambit of state 
responsibility.59  However, the language utilized in these statutes fails 
to clarify, for instance, whether natural resources located on 
federally-owned property belong to the federal government or the 
state wherein the property is located.60  One of the primary problems 
with regard to multiple trustees is linking the contamination problem 
of a particular resource to a particular trustee.  For example, the 
Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and the Department of 
Commerce both have trustee status with regard to the protection of 
migratory birds.61  As a result, a state may share trustee status over 
natural resources when there has been an injury to migratory birds 
stemming from the contamination of wetlands.62  Presumably, the 
federal government may recover damage to the birds, while the state 
trustee may recover damages for injury to the wetlands.  However, 
due to the principles prohibiting a double recovery for NRD63, the 
two trustees are precluded from both recovering for the birds and the 
wetlands. 
While there are more attempts at coordination now, overlapping 
trustee authority still inhibits action.  At some sites, parties have been 
unable to achieve prompt resolution of NRD issues at the time that 
remedial issues are being settled with the EPA or a state, due to the 
need for multiple trustee signoffs.  The difficulty of resolving 
overlapping jurisdictional issues is evidenced in United States v. 
Asarco, Inc., in which the plaintiffs, the United States, the Coeur 
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, and the State of Idaho, filed suit pursuant to 
CERCLA and the CWA for injury to natural resources in northern 
 
 59. Marc G. Laverdiere, Natural Resource Damages: Temporary Sanctuary for Federal 
Sovereign Immunity, 13 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 589, 591 (1994) (“For example, under CERCLA, 
liability for damaging these resources is ‘to the United States Government and to any State for 
natural resources within the State or belonging to, managed by, controlled by, or appertaining 
to such State.’”)(footnotes omitted). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Thomas L. Eggert & Kathleen A. Chorostecki, Rusty Trustees and the Lost Pots of 
Gold: Natural Resource Damage Trustee Coordination Under the Oil Pollution Act, 45 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 291, 305 (1993). 
 62. Id. 
 63. E.g., CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000); OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(3) (2000). 
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Idaho resulting from the defendants’ mining activities.64  A number of 
defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that a settlement 
agreement they had entered into with the State of Idaho precluded 
recovery by the Tribe or the United States.65  The United States 
argued that the State of Idaho did not have the authority to settle the 
federal government’s claims regarding the same natural resources.66  
The court agreed with the United States, stating “CERCLA does not 
give the state an exclusive right to bring a natural resource damages 
action if the state files the first lawsuit claiming natural resource 
damages and CERCLA does not prohibit more than one potential 
trustee from bringing a natural resource damages action.”67  The 
court’s decision that the record was insufficient to establish “the 
scope of trusteeship of the plaintiff over the land and water at 
issue”68 . . . and that “a more extensive factual record needs to be 
reviewed regarding whether or not USA was in privity with the State 
and/or the Tribe when the settlement agreements were entered with 
the defendants”69 demonstrates that the occurrence of overlapping 
trustee authority is not an issue that can easily be resolved.70 
The overlap of trustee authority also underscores the differences 
by which various federal trustees and their state or Indian tribe 
counterparts value NRD injuries and consider early dollar 
settlements.  All trustees will place a different value on the same 
natural resource.  For instance, natural resources may hold cultural or 
spiritual worth for an Indian tribe that are not considered by the state 
or federal government when valuing those resources for purposes of 
calculating damages.  Similarly, a state’s loss of revenue derived from 
fishing licenses would not necessarily be considered by the federal 
government when valuing the loss of a river to pollution. 
4. Municipal and Local Trustees 
Although the federal government, state government and Indian 
tribes are empowered to recover NRD, prior to the SARA 
Amendments, courts broadly read the NRD provision of the statute 
 
 64.  Nos. CV 96-0122-N-EJL, CV 91-342-N-EJL, 1998 WL 1799392 (D. Idaho March 31, 
1998). 
 65. Id. at *5. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Id. 
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as granting municipalities standing to pursue NRD claims.71  
However, with the enactment of the Amendments, courts’ 
interpretation of ‘municipality’ drastically changed: 
As originally enacted, CERCLA called for authorized 
representatives of the state to act as natural resource trustees but 
did not outline a procedure for appointing such trustees.  Under 
SARA, the governor of each state was charged with choosing an 
official to act on the public’s behalf as trustee and to assess damage 
to natural resources . . . [T]his change turned out to be significant to 
the courts dealing with standing for municipalities.  The courts 
interpreted this trustee-appointing mechanism to be the only way a 
municipality could be a natural resource trustee under CERCLA.72 
In Mayor and Council v. Klockner & Klockner, the municipality 
filed suit under CERCLA for recovery of costs associated with the 
defendants’ contamination of groundwater wells.73  The court 
ultimately determined that the SARA Amendments had “clarifie[d]” 
the issue of standing with regard to CERCLA claims, stating that 
“only a ‘state official,’ specifically appointed by the governor of the 
state, may be an ‘authorized representative’ for purposes of bringing 
an action to recover for natural resource damages.  SARA thus 
confirms Congress’ intent that Section 107(f) inure only to the benefit 
of the states and not their political subdivisions.”74  Courts have 
reached a similar finding as to the standing of a municipality when a 
state statute is comparable or analogous to CERCLA.75  
Municipalities, however, are not completely deprived of standing in 
the context of NRD.  If a municipality wishes to recover NRD under 
CERCLA or a similar state statute, it may still seek designation as 
“trustee” by the state.  In the alternative, municipalities may seek 
NRD by asserting common law claims.76 
 
 71. Mayor and Bd of Aldermen of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 667 
(D.N.J. 1985). 
 72. Michael J. Wittke, Municipal Recovery of Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, 
23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 921, 929 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 
 73. 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1043 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 74. Id. at 1049; see also Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 472-473 (D. 
Mass. 1991); City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials and Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 652 (N.D. 
Ohio 1993); Borough of Sayreville v. Union Carbide Corp.,923 F. Supp. 671, 680-81 (D.N.J. 
1996). 
 75. E.g., City of Portland v. Boeing Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1202-04 (D. Or. 2001); 
Consol. Indianapolis v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 1:02-cv-1340-LJM-WTL, 2003 WL 22327832, 
at *3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 2003). 
 76. Peter H. Lehner, Act Locally: Municipal Enforcement of Environmental Law, 12 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 50, 75 (1993). 
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5. Citizen Suits 
As noted earlier in the article, an individual who owns a natural 
resource has standing as a property owner to file suit to recover for 
any NRD.  However, a private party’s ability to file suit to recover 
damages for publicly owned natural resources is severely limited.  
One of the only avenues by which a private citizen or entity may 
pursue a claim for injury to publicly-owned natural resources is 
through a citizen suit.77  At the federal level, citizen suits generally 
occur in one of three contexts: 
(1) suits brought by private citizens against persons alleged to be in 
violation of a federal environmental law; (2) suits brought by 
private citizens against the executive branch of the federal 
government, typically the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), alleging that the federal government has failed to perform a 
nondiscretionary duty in implementing an environmental law; or 
(3) suits brought by private citizens against a federal agency 
directed at the agency’s own polluting activities.78 
Because citizen suits are brought to vindicate rights held by the 
public, private individuals who pursue claims under these provisions 
do not have the same rights and relief as those afforded under private 
causes of action.79  In addition, under the natural resource provisions 
of federal laws, individual plaintiffs are precluded from recovering 
NRD.80  Thus, individual plaintiffs may file a citizen suit to compel a 
trustee to seek NRD; however, such plaintiffs may not recover NRD. 
 
 77. “All major environmental laws, specifically the Clean Air Act, the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), as well as a host of less well known 
environmental laws, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act, contain essentially the same citizen suit provisions.  They all trace their 
origin to section 304 of the Clean Air Act.”  Robert D. Snook, Environmental Citizen Suits and 
Judicial Interpretation: First Time Tragedy, Second Time Farce, 20 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 311, 
313-314 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
 78. Shay S. Scott, Combining Environmental Citizen Suits & Other Private Theories of 
Recovery, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 369, 372-73 (1994) (footnote omitted). 
 79. Id. at 378 (quoting Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing a 
Gap in Federal Environmental Law, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 851, 870 (1989)) (“[Citizen suits] 
thus do not include toxic tort suits for personal injury or property damage.  They also do not 
include private suits for the personal losses suffered when public resources are damaged; for 
example, they do not include suits by fishermen when public fisheries are damaged by pollution.  
While losses to people from pollution are important, they are different from the losses to the 
environment itself.”). 
 80. See, e.g., In re Burbank Envtl. Litig., 42 F. Supp. 2d 976, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (“Under 
CERCLA, only natural resource trustees acting on behalf of the federal government, the state, 
and certain Indian tribes may bring an action for damage to natural resources.”). 
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Likewise, some state statutes also have similar citizen suit 
provisions that permit individuals to file actions for environmental 
contamination.  The New Jersey Environmental Rights Act 
(“ERA”),81 for example, permits an individual to file an action against 
“any other person alleged to be in violation of any statute, regulation 
or ordinance which is designed to prevent or minimize pollution, 
impairment or destruction of the environment” for injunctive or 
equitable relief.82  The ERA, however, does not “confer any 
substantive rights. . . . Rather, it grants private plaintiffs standing to 
enforce other New Jersey environmental statutes ‘as an alternative to 
inaction by the government which retains primary prosecutorial 
responsibility.’”83  Under the ERA, a citizen may file suit to compel 
the government to act to recover environmental damages, but the 
citizen may not personally seek damages.84  Although citizen suits 
may be a useful tool in compelling government action, they may not 
be used to recover NRD - the power to bring actions to recover NRD 
is vested solely with governmental trustees. 
B. Causes of Action 
1. State Statutory Causes of Action 
In addition to NRD actions brought pursuant to federal laws, 
states may also bring actions under state statutes.  It follows that if a 
state may sue on behalf of its natural resources, it may also legislate 
to protect them or provide for compensation in the event they are lost 
or destroyed.  Accordingly, some forty-six states provide a public 
cause of action for damage to natural resources.85 
 
 81. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:35A-1-2A:35A-14 (2006). 
 82. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:35A-4 (2006). 
 83. Mayor and Council v. Klockner & Klockner, 811 F. Supp. 1039, 1054  (D.N.J. 1993) 
(quoting Superior Air Prods. Co. v. NL Indus., Inc., 522 A.2d 1025, 1032 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
1987)). 
 84. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:35A-4, 2A:35A-6. 
 85. See William S. Roush, Jr., Natural Resource Damage Claims, § 25.22 n.154, in 2 TOXIC 
TORTS PRACTICE GUIDE (James T. O’Reilly ed., 2000).  For example, in Puerto Rice v. S.S. Zoe 
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), a Puerto Rican statute provided the basis for assessing 
damages for the discharge of oil.  In that case, the circuit court stated, “where the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has thus legislatively authorized the bringing of suits for 
environmental damages, and has earmarked funds so recovered to a special fund, such an action 
must be construed as taking the place of any implied common law action the Commonwealth as 
trustee, might have brought.”  Id. at 672. 
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These statutes vary widely in scope.  New York’s, for example, 
applies only to criminal violations;86 the laws of Maine and 
Massachusetts apply only to oil spills.87  Arguably the most 
comprehensive of these statutes are those of California and 
Minnesota.  California’s statute provides liability for “any damage or 
injury to the natural resources of the state, including, but not limited 
to, marine and wildlife resources, caused by the discharge or leakage 
of petroleum, fuel oil, or hazardous substances . . . .”88  Minnesota’s 
statute holds any discharger of hazardous substances liable for “all 
damages for any injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources 
including the reasonable costs for assessing such injury, destruction, 
or loss.”89 
A summary of these statutes indicates that most are aimed at 
protecting the natural resources under the public trust.  However, 
when definitions of natural resources are too narrow, there are 
resulting limitations on the recovery of NRD.  Accordingly, these 
statutes suffer some of the same problems as the public trust relative 
to the scope of natural resources protected.  Even the most 
comprehensive statutes limit recovery to hazardous substance 
damage.  The issue of scope is one of the greatest limitations on the 
recovery of NRD.  Thus, the question then follows: how should this 
problem be addressed? 
New Jersey has managed to overcome the problem of scope by 
defining natural resources broadly in its Spill Compensation and 
Control Act (“Spill Act”).90  ‘“Natural resources’” are broadly defined 
as “all land, fish, shellfish, wildlife, biota, air, waters and other such 
resources owned, managed, held in trust or otherwise controlled by 
the State.”91  Indeed, among the various state laws protecting natural 
resources, New Jersey has one of the most potent.92  The New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection is authorized by statute to 
commence civil actions for the “cost of restoration and replacement, 
where practicable, of any natural resource damaged or destroyed by a 
 
 86. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2723 (McKinney 1981). 
 87. See Maine Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 38 § 551 (2001); Massachusetts Oil Spill Prevention and Response Trust Fund, MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 21M, § 8 (2002). 
 88. CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 293 (West Supp. 2001). 
 89. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.04 (1)(c) (West 2005).  
 90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (1992). 
 91. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11b (1992). 
 92. See supra, text accompanying notes 82-85 
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discharge.”93  By enacting the Spill Act, the New Jersey Legislature 
created additional remedies to protect the environment and 
compensate the public.  The absolute liability provisions of the law 
are especially noteworthy.  Defining natural resources to encompass a 
wide variety of resources has proven successful in addressing the 
problem of scope with regard to any limitations upon NRD recovery. 
2. Common Law Causes of Action 
In addition to available statutory causes of action, state 
governments may pursue common law causes of action to recover for 
NRD.95  To protect a natural resource held in common, or to 
compensate for its injuries, the state may sue in its trustee capacity.  
In the case of natural resources held by no one, the state may sue to 
enjoin under a public nuisance theory.  Such causes of action are 
especially useful to close the gap where federal statutes do not 
provide adequate relief.96 
Public nuisance actions, for example, were traditionally used to 
obtain injunctive relief, enjoining certain behavior deemed to 
constitute an “unreasonable interference with a right common to the 
general public.”97  Courts have increasingly held, however, that a state 
may utilize public nuisance actions to recover response costs incurred 
in the abatement of such a nuisance.98  If the state would like to 
recover for a pecuniary loss arising from contamination of a natural 
resource, however, it must allege a “special injury.”99  In New Mexico 
v. General Electric Co., the court discussed what constitutes a “special 
injury”: 
 
 93. N.J. STAT. ANN.58:10-23.11u.b(4) (1992). 
 95. For a more detailed discussion, see generally Kanner, supra note 9. 
 96. See James D. Lawlor, Right to Maintain Action to Enjoin Public Nuisance As Affected 
by Existence of Pollution Control Agency, 60 A.L.R. 3d 665, 669 (1974) (until federal statutes 
are more comprehensive, “public nuisance suits retain their vitality”).  Federal statutes are 
sometimes less desirable than other theories with regard to the recovery of NRD.  CERCLA, 
for example, has more defenses and involves a slow and rigid process, thus state law theories are 
often better.  Furthermore, a plaintiff may recover more damages bringing a common law claim, 
rather than brining an action under CERCLA. 
 97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 821B (1979). 
 98. See Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R.Co., 653 F.2d 1123, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(permitting recovery of expenses incurred cleaning up groundwater contamination); New York 
v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 n. 14 (noting in dicta that “New York law appears to 
provide the State with restitution costs in a public nuisance action.”); Camden County Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 n.10 (D.N.J. 2000) (“This 
Court agrees that for abatement of a public nuisance, New Jersey law permits cost recovery.”) 
 99. New Mexico v. General Electric Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1239 (D.N.M. 2004). 
03__KANNER_ZIEGLER.DOC 2/6/2007  4:57 PM 
138 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 17:119 
To satisfy the “special injury” requirement in this case and establish 
any entitlement to compensatory damages on their common-law 
public nuisance claim, the Plaintiffs must show that the State has 
suffered some discrete physical harm or pecuniary loss apart from 
the more generalized injury to the public’s interest that results from 
the public nuisance . . . Absent proof of some discrete “special 
injury” to the State’s interest apart from the injury to the public’s 
interest in unappropriated groundwater, Plaintiffs may be limited 
to equitable relief seeking the abatement of the claimed nuisance.100 
New Jersey, in particular, has a rich common law tradition with 
respect to the imposition of liability for environmental injuries and 
the development of comprehensive and effective remedies.101  The 
common law has continued to develop despite the enactment of 
statutory law on both the federal and state levels addressing 
environmental liabilities.  State, Department of Environmental 
Protection v. Ventron Corp. makes clear that common law remedies 
remain available notwithstanding collateral or supplementary 
statutory remedies.102  Ventron also provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the history of New Jersey law on these remedies103 and 
specifically notes that: 
[T]oxic wastes are “abnormally dangerous,” and the disposal of 
them, past or present, is an abnormally dangerous activity. We 
recognize that one engaged in the disposing of toxic waste may be 
performing an activity that is of some use to society. Nonetheless, 
“the unavoidable risk of harm that is inherent in it requires that it 
be carried on at his peril rather than at the expense of the innocent 
person who suffers harm as a result of it.”104 
The Ventron decision set forth what has become a founding principle 
in the development of environmental common law in New Jersey: 
 
 100. Id. at 1240-41; see also Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of 
Am.., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).  The court held that “the State, acting in its 
capacity as property owner, and not merely in its representative capacity, can seek damages as 
well as injunctive relief . . .”  Id. at 603.  The court went on to determine that “the State does 
have a legally cognizable interest in the ground waters affected here which suffice to support a 
claim for damages.”  Id. at 606. 
 101. New Jersey’s proactive and continuous use of the common law in NRD recovery 
actions provides a valuable template for other states to utilize in their own NRD actions. 
 102. 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983). 
 103. Id. at 157. 
 104. Id. at 160 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 520 cmt. h, at 39 (1977)).  Cases 
subsequent to Ventron have held that whether pollution activity is a basis for direct liability is to 
be determined on a case-by-case approach following the Restatement principles.  See, e.g., T & 
E Industries Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 546 A.2d 570 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), aff’d as 
modified, 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991); Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1985), rev’d, 517 A.2d 484 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (overruling trial court’s 
denial of defendant’s motion for a right to trial by jury). 
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“[t]hose who poison the land must pay for its cure.”105  In light of this 
principle, the New Jersey courts have emphasized that their primary 
concern in resolving environmental cases is to do so with underlying 
considerations of “reasonableness, fairness and morality” rather than 
the “formulary labels” which might be attached to particular causes of 
action.106 In addition to strict liability, other traditional tort theories 
remain viable.  Nuisance,107 trespass,108  negligence,109  and fraud110 have 
all been successfully asserted in New Jersey environmental cases.  
Punitive damages are available in environmental actions involving 
deliberate acts or omissions committed with the knowledge of a high 
degree of probability of harm, reckless indifference to consequences, 
or where there has been “such a conscious and deliberate disregard of 
the rights of others that his conduct may be called willful or 
wanton.”111  Indeed, state statutory limitations on the availability of 
punitive damages have specifically excluded “environmental 
tort[s].”112 
C. Causation 
When a common law claim for NRD is brought, a plaintiff must 
prove causation with respect to the claim as required by the common 
law.113  When a trustee brings NRD claims under federal legislation, 
the degree of causation must be gleaned from the statute.  If the 
statute does not specify the standard of proof necessary for causation, 
it is left to the courts to determine what is required.  In both cases, 
causation is not an especially difficult hurdle.  The causation 
requirement ensures that the conduct complained of is appropriately 
linked to the wrong claimed - the natural resource injury, nuisance, or 
trespass. 
CERCLA, for example, does not specify the standard of proof 
necessary for showing that a particular discharge or release caused a 
 
 105. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 160. 
 106. T & E Industries Inc., 546 A.2d at 577(quoting Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol 
Chem. Corp., 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962)); Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1324. 
 107. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 157-58, overruling Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. 1876); But see Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1324. 
 108. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 158 (N.J. 1983). 
 109. Kenney, 497 A.2d at 1324, 28. 
 110. Ventron, 468 A.2d at 166. 
 111. Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 497 A.2d 1310, 1323 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (quoting 
WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, TORTS (5th ed. 1984), § 2 at 9-10). 
 112. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:58C-6 (2000). 
 113. Kanner, supra note 9 at 59. 
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particular injury.  Under §107(a)(4)(c), NRD trustees seeking 
restoration must prove injury to natural resources “resulting from” a 
release of a hazardous substance.  Courts have generally required 
only a minimal connection between the responsible party and the 
response costs incurred in connection with a release.114 
In Ohio v. Department of Interior, the D.C. Circuit held that 
CERCLA was ambiguous as to the standard of causation to be 
applied in determining whether a hazardous substance release caused 
a particular injury.115  The court concluded that DOI’s position that 
the traditional common law standard of causation should be applied 
was a permissible reading of the statute.116  Consequently, trustees 
must be able to meet traditional causation standards when showing 
that a particular spill or release caused or, at the very least, was a 
“contributing factor” to a particular injury.117 
In National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of 
Interior, the court stated “CERCLA is ambiguous on the precise 
question of what standard of proof is required to demonstrate that 
natural resource injuries were caused by, or ‘resulting from,’ a 
particular release.” 118  The same court stated in Kennecott Utah 
Copper Corp. v. Department of Interior that “[w]hile the statutory 
language requires some causal connection between the element of 
damages and the injury - the damages must be ‘for’ an injury 
‘resulting from a release of oil or a hazardous substance’ - Congress 
has not specified precisely what that causal relationship should be.” 119  
This may require proof of a causal link between the defendant’s 
release and the injured resource.120 
In Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corp.,121 the district 
court held that where perchlorate contamination originated at one 
site and allegedly migrated to the wells owned by the plaintiff water 
 
 114. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146 (1st Cir. 
1989). 
 115. 880 F.2d 432, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See, e.g., Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1124 (D. Idaho 
2003) (requiring use of “contributing factor” causation test in NRD action by Native American 
tribe and United States against mining companies).  In Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the court 
concluded that volumetric tailings production provided a sufficiently reasonable basis for 
apportionment to defeat joint and several liability.  Id. at 1120-21. 
 118. 134 F.3d 1095, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Ohio v. DOI, 880 F.2d at 472). 
 119. 88 F.3d 1191, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 120. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D. Idaho 1986). 
 121. 272 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2003). 
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providers at a different site, plaintiffs can satisfy their burden of 
production with respect to CERCLA causation by: (1) identifying 
perchlorate at their site; (2) identifying perchlorate at defendant’s 
site; and, (3) providing “evidence of a plausible migration pathway by 
which the contaminant could have traveled from the defendant’s 
facility to the plaintiff’s site.”122  Where the plaintiffs satisfy this 
burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer evidence 
“disproving causation.”123 
In Coeur D’Alene Tribe v. Asarco Inc., the district court applied 
a “contributing factor” causation test for the recovery of NRD.124  
That is, where hazardous waste from multiple defendants has 
commingled, the plaintiff trustee has the burden of proving that each 
defendant’s release is a more than a de minimis “contributing factor” 
to the natural resource injuries alleged by the trustee.125 
One last causation burden exists for trustees in the context of 
assessing NRD.  The DOI’s NRD assessment (“NRDA”) 
regulations126 require that trustees determine the baseline condition of 
the injured resource and then compare that baseline with the injured 
status of the resource to quantify injury.127  “Baseline” is defined 
under the DOI NRDA regulations as “the condition or conditions 
that would have existed at the assessment area had the discharge of oil 
or release under investigation not occurred.”128  While the trustee has 
the burden of determining baseline under the NRDA regulations, 
defendants should ensure that the trustee is apprised of all 
appropriate conditions or factors impacting the resource other than 
the release of the hazardous substances at issue. 
These cases demonstrate a key issue with regard to causation - 
ultimately, causation is not difficult to prove.  Furthermore, even if 
the contamination is mingled between multiple PRPs, it will not be 
difficult to show causation sufficient to prevail in a suit for NRD.  
These cases also show the potential interplay of substantive law and 
case management issues.  For example, it should be sufficient to 
prove wrongful misconduct and some causation so as to establish the 
 
 122. Id. at 1066. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1114 (D. Idaho 2003). 
 125. Id. at 1124. 
 126. 43 C.F.R. § 11 (2005). 
 127. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (2005). 
 128. 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (2005) (emphasis added). 
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liability of a responsible party and thereby shift the cost of a 
comprehensive NRDA to the wrongdoer as opposed to the trustee. 
D. Injury 
A natural resource injury is “any adverse change or impact of a 
discharge on a natural resource or impairment of natural resource 
services, whether direct or indirect, long-term or short-term, and 
includes the partial or complete destruction or loss of the natural 
resource.”129 
Clarity with regard to assertion of the type of injury to a natural 
resource is an essential component of bringing a successful claim for 
NRD.  If a plaintiff does not clearly and specifically define and 
quantify the nature of the injury, there is a significant risk that a claim 
for NRD will fail.  In New Mexico v. General Electric Co., the 
plaintiffs were prevented from recovering NRD due to their failure to 
clearly and accurately set forth the nature of the injuries they 
claimed.130  Plaintiffs asserted a claim for the loss of drinking water 
services as a result of chemical contamination emanating from the 
defendants’ operations.131  The court held that the drinking water 
standards promulgated by the New Mexico Water Quality Control 
Commission (“NMWQCC”) should be used to determine if there was 
an injury-the loss of drinking water services.132  Under these rules, 
water must only meet the requisite standards with regard to the level 
of contaminants; the water need not be pristine to qualify as 
potable.133  The plaintiffs, however, contended that the drinking water 
standards were not the proper means of identifying the injury.134  The 
court disagreed, stating: 
In effect, then, Plaintiffs now argue two different theories of injury: 
(1) that “[t]he standard for drinking water quality for the 
groundwater involved in this lawsuit is the more stringent 
NMWQCC health-based toxic pollutant standard”; and (2) that 
“the groundwater and aquifer will remain injured unless and until it 
is restored to its pre-contaminated condition.”  These two 
assertions, often made together, are not wholly congruent. 
. . . . 
 
 129. Kanner, supra note 16, at 98. 
 130. 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1212 (D.N.M. 2004). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1210. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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. . . In this case, it may well be that the State of New Mexico has 
suffered an injury to its interest in the groundwater underlying the 
South Valley Site, notwithstanding the fact that much of the 
groundwater meets the New Mexico drinking water standards, but 
it may be that the injury is not the total and permanent loss of 
drinking water services that Plaintiffs now assert. 
To date, however, Plaintiffs have proffered no significant probative 
evidence of any diminution in value of the groundwater, measured 
by the difference between its current condition and its formerly 
pristine state, apart from the alleged loss of drinking water services.  
No expert witness has testified as to the economic value of water 
that may prove to be drinkable, but still not pristine. 
. . . Plaintiffs’ own characterization of their alleged injury selects the 
legal standard to be applied to measure the existence and extent of 
that injury.  Drinkability does not equate with pristine purity under 
New Mexico law, and the court remains convinced that a loss of 
drinking water services must be measured by applying New Mexico 
drinking water standards.135 
What this case demonstrates is that quantification of the type of 
natural resource injury is essential to a successful recovery.  The 
plaintiffs may have succeeded had they considered what loss of use 
involves before asserting it as the primary injury.136  It also 
demonstrates that NRD claims for injury relating solely to loss of use 
are generally weaker and have a lower possibility of success then a 
claim for restoration where there is an injury by mere virtue of the 
existence of contaminants in the natural resource. 
One of the most critical factors in recovering NRD is the distinct 
nature and extent of the injury and what that means for damages.  It 
must be remembered that proving how a natural resource has been 
injured is not the same as proving what amount of damages should be 
recoverable. 
 
 135. Id. at 1211-12 (footnotes omitted). 
 136. Credibility with regard to NRD claims is essential, especially when non-traditional 
injuries are being asserted.  “Before a lawyer can persuade a jury or any fact-finder, it is 
necessary to start at the beginning and decide what the case is about.  Surprisingly, many 
lawyers never really know this fact, or they (or their experts) change their game plan so often 
that it seems they have no plan. . . . In short, the case should be as planned as possible before 
going to court.”  ALLAN KANNER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND TOXIC TORT TRIALS § 1.01 (2d ed. 
2004). 
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E. Damages 
1. Generally 
The method and manner of quantifying damages to a natural 
resource is perhaps the greatest challenge for NRD litigation, both 
presently and in the future.137  “Damage is a legal concept determining 
what a liable party has to do or pay to make the public or 
environment whole for the injuries to natural resources.”138  In 
addition, damages help to deter future misconduct.139  NRD is defined 
by CERCLA as the compensation for the “[i]njury to, destruction of, 
or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of 
assessing such injury.”140 CERCLA’s congressional hearings are filled 
with testimony that the NRD provisions should measure society’s full 
loss from damaged or destroyed natural resources, not just damages 
capable of market valuation.141  This is fundamental to deterring 
wrongful conduct.142  This broader concept is reflected in § 301(c)(2) 
of CERCLA, which requires damage assessment procedures to 
identify the extent of short- and long-term, direct and indirect injury, 
destruction, or loss.143  Thus, Congress explicitly stated that 
recoverable injuries were not limited solely to use or market value 
but also indirect injury (for example, the intrinsic value of a natural 
resource).  Comments also urged that the legislation shift the burden 
of any such losses from victims to responsible parties, consistent with 
concepts of strict liability.144  If a response action fails to provide a 
complete and whole remedy for injury to a natural resource, damages 
 
 137. Because of the complex nature of damages, the damages phase may be bifurcated from 
the rest of the trial.  “Bifurcation of an action is appropriate where . . . there are complicated 
issues of liability that must be resolved prior to the assessment of damages.”  Witherbee v. 
Honeywell, Inc., 151 F.R.D. 27, 29 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 138. See Kanner, supra note 16, at 104. 
 139. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (quoting San Diego 
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)) (“[t]he obligation to pay 
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and 
controlling policy.”). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(6), 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000). 
 141. See, e.g., Oil and Hazardous Substances Liability and Oil Pollution Liability: Excerpts 
from Hearings on H.R. 29 and H.R. 85 Before the Subcomm. On Coast Guard and Navigation 
of the House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (1979) 
(statement of James N. Barnes, Center for Law and Social Reform). 
 142. See generally Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Measuring Loss of Use Damages in Natural 
Resource Damage Actions, 30 COLUMBIA J. ENVTL. L. 417 (2005). 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (2000). 
 144. Supra note 141, at 213, 214, n. 23 (statement of Sarah Chasis, National Advisory 
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere). 
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may be recovered for such.145  Any recovery had by a trustee for NRD 
“must be used to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent” of the 
injured natural resources.146 
There are three primary categories of damages for a trustee to 
consider: restoration, compensatory restoration, and assessment and 
other transaction costs. 
a. Restoration 
Restoration, or primary restoration costs, involves the cost of any 
action, or combination of actions, to restore, rehabilitate, replace, or 
acquire the equivalent of the injured natural resources and services in 
a “baseline state.”147  Essentially, this is the cost of restoration of the 
resource to its pre-damage condition, taking into account natural 
recovery.  Replacement can be a viable action in this context, so long 
as the citizens of a state do not otherwise suffer.  For instance, 
replacing a North Louisiana greenspace with an equivalent one in 
South Louisiana does little to assuage the damage to residents of 
North Louisiana.  A state should have the right to full restoration of 
natural resources, however, even if it will ultimately be more costly 
than replacement.  This idea is consistent with the notion that there is 
a preference for complete restoration of the damaged natural 
resource, rather than the creation of an entirely new one. 
b. Compensatory Restoration 
In addition, there are use and non-use148 compensatory 
restoration values that must be repaid.  These damages involve the 
provision of additional restoration of injured resources to compensate 
for lost natural resource functions and services from the time of 
contamination through the time the resource is restored.149  
Compensatory restoration is not directly defined in the statutory 
language of the OPA and CERCLA, although it is discussed in the 
regulations developed under each of these statutes. 
The OPA regulations, promulgated by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) define restoration as “any 
action or combination of actions, to restore, rehabilitate, replace or 
 
 145. See Kanner, supra note 16, at 102. 
 146. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000). 
 147. 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (2005). 
 148. “Nonuse values are values people may hold for natural resource services that are 
independent of any anticipated use of the resource.”  William H. Desvousges & Janet C. Lutz, 
Compensatory Restoration: Economic Principles and Practice, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 412 (2000). 
 149. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.83 (2005). 
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acquire the equivalent of injured natural resources and services.”  
These same regulations identify “compensatory restoration” as 
included within restoration generally and define it as “action(s) 
taken to make the environment and the public whole for services 
losses that occur from the date of the incident until recovery of the 
injured natural resources.”150 
Due consideration must be given to discern the unique value of the 
natural resources of the state.  Natural resources are more than mere 
property claims.  They are inextricably interwoven into the fabric of 
our ecology and the quality of our lives as we steward them from one 
generation of our citizens to the next.  Natural resources must be 
valued both presently and prospectively.  If these prospective 
consequences may, in reasonable probability, be expected to flow 
from the past harm, the state is entitled to be paid for them.151  Loss of 
use, or benefit to polluter, both damage the people during the period 
of impairment and restoration.  These damages should be equal to the 
benefit derived or savings to the parties damaging the natural 
resource.  If, for instance, a natural resource was damaged by one 
thousand dollars to save or make one million dollars, this should be 
recaptured to the extent not otherwise covered.  This item of damages 
forces the wrongdoer to internalize the costs of pollution by usage fee 
or unjust enrichment.152 
c. Costs 
Another important measure of damages is the assessment and 
other transaction costs.  These damages include all costs, expenses 
and fees incurred by the state, including due diligence and pre-
litigation costs and attorney fees, in recovering the foregoing.153  Also 
included is the time value of money.154  Compensation for transaction 
 
 150. See Kanner, supra note 16, at 103 (citations omitted). 
 151. See Coll v. Sherry, 148 A.2d 481, 486 (N.J. 1959) (stating that “[i]f the prospective 
consequences may, in reasonable probability, be expect to flow from the past harm, plaintiff is 
entitled to be indemnified for them” when recovering damages for a tortuous personal injury). 
 152. See Allan Kanner, Unjust Enrichment in Environmental Litigation, 20 J. ENVTL. L. & 
LITIG. 111, 112 (2005). 
 153. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(4) (2000). 
 154. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.84  (2001).  Section 
9607(b)(4)(C) provides that responsible parties may be held liable for “damages for injury to, 
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such 
injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.”  However, under section 9607(f), a 
trustee may not recover for natural resource losses occurring before the date of CERCLA’s 
enactment (December 11, 1980), or for losses identified in an environmental impact assessment, 
which are deemed to be authorized by permit or license.  Likewise, under section 9607(c), the 
trustee may not recover in excess of $50 million unless a showing is made that the release 
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costs means full restoration.  It is important to note that costs are not 
necessarily available under non-CERCLA state law theories unless 
equity is involved. 
2. Valuation 
There are numerous approaches to determining value for NRD.  
One example is the valuation approach of the DOI.155  While it seeks 
restoration as its goal, the DOI program sometimes works in the 
opposite direction, for example, when a defendant is permitted to 
purchase a cheaper replacement rather than restore the natural 
resource.  Like many tort cases, it places an emphasis on assessing 
damage in a monetary framework, as opposed to restoration, as the 
means to making the public whole, and thus is perceived by the 
regulated community to be punitive rather than productive.156 
On the other hand is the more industry-friendly approach of 
NOAA.  Under the NOAA approach, NRD focuses on remediation 
of harm rather than monetization of claims.157  In addition, it utilizes 
an open process that requires public comment, and encourages 
cooperation with responsible parties rather than litigation.  The 
NOAA regime is “restoration based,” that is, it establishes 
restoration of the damaged natural resources as the goal,158 and 
provides the agency and the responsible party a great deal of 
flexibility to develop a plan to move forward and achieve it.  In 
general, there is more room for disagreement regarding valuation of 
loss of use claims.159 
 
resulted from willful misconduct or willful negligence, or from a violation of federal safety or 
operating standards. 
 155. Under the DOI rules, the measure of damages “is the cost of restoration or 
replacement of the damaged resource.  Additionally, compensable value, the value of the lost 
services of the resource during the time period from the injury until the baseline conditions have 
been returned, is available for recovery at the discretion of the trustee.  The trustee can chose 
between several valuation methods for estimating compensable value, including market 
valuation, appraisal, factor income, travel cost, hedonic pricing, unit value, contingent valuation, 
or other suitable valuation methods.  The use of contingent valuation for measuring option and 
existence value is available only when the trustee determines there are no relevant use values.”  
James Peck, Measuring Justice for Nature: : Issues in Evaluating and Litigating Natural Resource 
Damages, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 301 (1999). 
 156. See id. at 281. 
 157. See Kanner, supra note 16, at 103-04. 
 158. Id. at 103. 
 159. See Kanner & Nagy, supra note 142. 
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F. Defenses 
Because the pursuit of NRD is relatively new territory, one of 
the areas with the greatest potential for development and change is 
the defenses to liability.  As NRD cases are more frequently litigated, 
new, creative, and complex defenses will be asserted.  Plaintiffs can 
anticipate a variety of defenses that may be offered by defendants in 
NRD cases.  A defendant may argue, for example, that if a 
groundwater resource is not currently being used by the public, then 
there has been no harm suffered if it is contaminated.  Defendants 
may also contest liability when there are multiple polluters of a single 
resource, thereby making it difficult to attribute particular 
contamination to a specific source.  Furthermore, a defendant may 
argue that a remedy is not reasonable or proportionate to the harm, 
for example, when restoration costs far exceed the market value of 
the property. 
1. Statutory Defenses 
Most federal environmental statutes specifically enumerate 
defenses to liability available to a defendant in NRD actions.  
CERCLA, for example, provides that a person otherwise liable for 
contamination will not be liable in the event the damages resulting 
from the release or threat of release were caused “solely by-(1) an act 
of God; (2) an act of war; (3) [or] an act or omission of a third 
party. . . .”160 Similar provisions are found in the CWA161 and OPA162 
 
 160. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000). 
 161. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (2000) (“Except where an owner or operator can prove that a 
discharge was caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) negligence on the part 
of the United States Government, or (D) an act or omission of a third party without regard to 
whether any such act or omission was or was not negligence . . . such owner or operator of any 
vessel from which oil or a hazardous substance  is discharged . . . shall . . . be liable to the United 
States Government for the actual costs incurred under subsection (c) of this section for the 
removal of such oil or substance by the United States Government . . .”).  Interpreting these 
provisions: 
“CERLCA’s use of the word ‘omission’ in the phrase ‘act or omission’ of a third party 
suggests that the conduct of the third party must be wrongful.  After all, an omission 
can only exist in relation to a duty to act.  The Clean Water Act defense, however, 
expressly provides that the act or omission of the third party need not be negligent to 
qualify as the sole cause.  The defense is available ‘without regard to whether any such 
act or omission was or was not negligent.’  One significant difference between the third 
party defense of the Clean Water Act and CERCLA is that the CERCLA does not 
contain this exception, suggesting perhaps that one way to distinguish the causation of 
the defendant and the third party is that the defendant must prove that the third 
party’s conduct was somehow wrongful.” 
James R. MacAyeal, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act: The Correct Paradigm of Strict Liability and the Problem of Individual Causation, 18 UCLA 
J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 217, 312-13 (2000/2001). 
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Because of their limited application, however, these “formal” 
defenses are rarely successful.  “Informal defenses,” such as those 
described below provide defendants with the opportunity to more 
successfully contest liability. 
2. Applicability of CERCLA 
One important issue with regard to defenses to CERCLA is the 
applicability of the statute.  CERCLA does not apply retroactively.  
Section 107(f)(1) of CERCLA states “[t]here shall be no recovery . . . 
where such damages and the release of hazardous substance from 
which such damages regulated have occurred wholly before 
December 11, 1980 [enactment day of CERCLA].”163  Thus, if NRD 
occurred on or before December 11, 1980, a defendant is not liable 
under CERCLA.164  “[W]here damages are readily divisible [between 
pre and post-enactment damages], the sovereigns cannot recover for 
such damages incurred prior to the enactment . . . In cases where the 
natural resource damages are not divisible and the damages or 
releases that caused the damages continue post-enactment, the 
sovereigns can recover for such non-divisible damages in their 
entirety.”165 
In Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Asarco, Inc., the United States and the 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe sought to recover NRD associated with releases 
of mine wastes.166  The defendants argued that no hazardous 
substance releases had occurred after CERCLA’s enactment in 1980, 
and no post enactment damages had occurred because environmental 
conditions in the Coeur d’Alene Basin had continuously improved.167  
The trustees argued that the contaminants continued to be released 
and re-released, and maintained that the critical date, for purposes of 
CERCLA, is when an injury is quantified.168 
 
 162. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2000) (“A responsible party is not liable for removal costs or 
damages under section 2702 of this title if the responsible party establishes, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that the discharge or substantial threat of a discharge of oil and the resulting 
damages or removal costs were caused solely by-(1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act 
or omission of a third party . . . .”). 
 163. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) 2000. 
 164. United States v. Reilly Tar and Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1120 (D. Minn. 1982). 
 165. In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor Proceeding, 716 F. Supp. 676, 685-86 
(D. Mass. 1989). 
 166. 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1114 (D. Idaho 2003). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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The court ruled that CERCLA’s “wholly before” limitation did 
not bar the plaintiffs from recovery.169  The court found that “passive 
migration caused by leaching from variations in low and high water is 
a post-enactment release under CERCLA.”170 Furthermore, the court 
concluded that the “passive movement and migration of hazardous 
substances by mother nature (no human action assisting in the 
movement) is still a ‘release’ for purposes of CERCLA in this case.”171  
The court then relied on Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., v. Pintlar 
Corp.,172  and In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor 
Proceedings,173 to conclude that “damages” for purposes of the 
“wholly before” limitation are defined as the “monetary 
quantification of the injury.”174  The court held that “damages 
occurred post-enactment when the federal government and Tribe 
began studying the ‘injury’ caused by the mining industry and how to 
clean up the injury to natural resources.”175  Distinguishing the Ninth 
Circuit’s 2002 en banc decision in Carson Harbor,176 the court ruled 
that the defendants’ releases did not occur “wholly before” 1980 
because the continued, post-enactment passive migration of the 
contaminants constituted a “release” or “re-release” under the 
statute.177  The district court further held that even if all of the 
defendants’ releases occurred before 1980, the plaintiffs’ claim would 
still not be barred by section 9607(f) because “the damages associated 
with such releases occurred post-enactment . . . the statute only 
excuses liability if the release and the damages both occur pre-
enactment.”178 
In Montana v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Judge Haddon reached the 
opposite conclusion on CERCLA’s “wholly before” limitation.179  
Montana brought an NRD action against Atlantic Richfield seeking 
to recover restoration costs at “upland areas” in the Clark Fork River 
Basin.180  The court rejected the theory that damages do not occur 
 
 169. Id. at 1113-14. 
 170. Id. at 1113 
 171. Id. 
 172. 948 F. 2d 1507 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 173. 716 F. Supp. 676, 681 (D. Mass. 1989). 
 174. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Ascaro, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1114 (D. Idaho 2003). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp, 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 
 177. Coeur d’Alene, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 1113. 
 178. Id. at 1114. 
 179. Montana v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1245 (D. Mont. 2003). 
 180. Id. at 1239. 
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until expenses are incurred or costs are quantified, finding that such a 
theory is “unpersuasive” and would render the “wholly before” 
limitation in the statute meaningless.181  Instead, the court held that 
“damages accrue or occur, including restoration costs, when the 
underlying injury occurs.”182  The court barred the state of Montana’s 
claim for restoration cost damages because such damages occurred 
wholly before December 11, 1980.183 
3. NRD and Site Remediation are the Same 
A defendant may also attempt to defend against its liability by 
taking advantage of the fact that most judges do not possess a 
significant degree of sophistication with regard to environmental 
issues.  In the event a judge is not familiar with this highly specialized 
area of law, a defendant may attempt to blur the distinction between 
costs associated with site remediation and the recovery of NRD.  
There is, however, a clear distinction between the goals of 
remediation and those for the recovery of NRD.  With regard to site 
remediation, a PRP is responsible for the costs associated with the 
remediation of the pollution.  NRD is designed to compensate the 
public for the damage to its natural resources and the loss of use 
resulting from the resource’s contamination. 
In an effort to avoid the payment of damages for the destruction 
of natural resources, a defendant may argue that the site remediation 
must be completed before NRD can be assessed.  While a defendant 
engages in countless site assessments and feasibility studies, the loss 
of use of the natural resource and the continued degradation of the 
site is being ignored.  Consequently, a defendant is actually 
attempting to postpone a realization of its liability under the guise of 
“action.”  However, as discussed earlier, site remediation can last for 
years without any actual cleanup occurring.184 
A defendant may argue that since it is engaged in site 
remediation, a cost-benefit analysis, which is often used in the context 
of site remediation, is appropriate for the assessment of NRD.  
However, no court has ever used a cost-benefit analysis to value 
NRD.  If a cost-benefit analysis is used to determine the amount of 
money that is recoverable for NRD, the public will almost never be 
 
 181. Id. at 1243-44. 
 182. Id. at 1242. 
 183. Id. at 1245. 
 184. See Kanner, supra note 12. 
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fully restored because the nonmonetary value of the natural resources 
cannot be fully and fairly calculated. 
4. Preemption of Federal Law 
When a trustee files a claim for NRD pursuant to state law, one 
common defense that a defendant may assert is that the law on which 
the claim is based is preempted by federal law.  Generally, there are 
three ways in which a state law may be preempted by federal law.  
First, Congress can explicitly state in a federal statute that it preempts 
state law. 185  Second, state law that legislates in an area that Congress 
has exclusively reserved to the federal government will be 
preempted.186  Third, state law will also be preempted if it conflicts 
with federal law.187  “The presumption is that powers historically 
belonging to the states are not preempted by federal legislation unless 
that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”188  The fact that 
the states have historically been entrusted with the protection of 
natural resources lends credence to the argument that federal laws 
will rarely preempt state law claims for NRD. 
In In re Allied Towing Corp., a party who spilled oil into the 
Chesapeake Bay filed a complaint seeking limitation of liability 
pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act189 and § 1321(f) of the 
CWA.190  The United States responded by filing a claim for cleanup 
costs and the State of Virginia also responded by filing a claim 
seeking civil penalties, cleanup costs and damages for injury to 
natural resources.191  The court held that federal law does not 
supersede a valid exercise of a state’s police power unless there is a 
specific manifestation of Congress’ intent to preempt state law.192  
With respect to the interaction between the CWA and Virginia state 
statutes, the court stated: 
Nothing in this scheme [of the CWA], however, conflicts with or 
otherwise preempts any state statute, such as Virginia’s, imposing 
liability on the owner or operator of any vessel which illegally 
discharges oil, nor does it limit  the amount of liability.  Similarly, 
 
 185. Attorney General v. Consumers Power Co., 508 N.W.2d 901, 902 ( Mich. Ct. App. 
1993). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (repealed 1976). 
 190. In re Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398, 400 (E.D. Va. 1979). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 401. 
03__KANNER_ZIEGLER.DOC 2/6/2007  4:57 PM 
Fall 2006] NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE 153 
nothing in the FWPCA precludes the states from imposing civil 
penalties upon vessel owners or operators who violate state statutes 
by discharging oil illegally.  It merely provides the states with an 
alternative federal remedy which assures that, either through the 
action and expenditure of the state or Federal Government, the 
natural resources of this country will be preserved.”193 
Preemption of state law often arises in the context of NRD when 
the resource that has been injured is a navigable body of water, thus 
seemingly invoking admiralty and maritime issues.  However, courts 
have consistently held that state actions are not preempted by federal 
law when state law does not conflict with federal law and Congress 
has not specifically legislated the issue.194  In general, federal 
environmental statutes are not enacted to supplant state statutory and 
common law causes of action; rather, they are meant to be 
supplements to ensure that trustees have adequate means by which 
they may seek and recover NRD. 
5. Scope of the Public Trust Doctrine 
When NRD claims are brought pursuant to the public trust 
doctrine, it is highly likely that a defendant will contest the scope of 
the doctrine’s application.  As noted in section II.A.1, infra, in early 
United States cases, the public trust doctrine was applied to suits 
involving the protection of navigable waters.195  The doctrine has 
evolved over time, however, and has been expanded to include the 
protection of not only navigable waters, but other resources, 
including wildlife196 and beaches.197  Some states have even extended 
the doctrine to include recreational activities such as sailing, 
swimming, hunting and the enjoyment of scenic and aesthetic 
beauty.198 
 
 193. Id. at 403. 
 194. See, e.g., In re Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the Rhode Island Environmental Injury Compensation act that permits state law 
remedies for damage resulting from oil pollution is not preempted by federal maritime law); In 
re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that New Jersey’s 
common law with respect to the recovery of purely economic losses “is not preempted as 
impermissibly prejudicing federal maritime law); But see Maryland v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220, 
1228 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that federal law preempts state natural resources code when it 
alters the rights and liabilities afforded to the parties under federal maritime law). 
 195. For a more complete discussion of the evolution of the public trust doctrine, see 
generally Kanner, supra note 9. 
 196. In re Steuart Transp., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
 197. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972). 
 198. Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 146 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Wis. 1966). 
03__KANNER_ZIEGLER.DOC 2/6/2007  4:57 PM 
154 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 17:119 
Despite the fact that there is a trend toward expansion, those 
who oppose an extension of the doctrine contend that the inclusion of 
other resources is not consistent with the historic foundation of the 
doctrine.199  A prime example of this debate is the issue of whether 
groundwater should be protected by the public trust doctrine. 
The vital role groundwater plays in the survival and development 
of the United States is rapidly emerging as an important and visible 
issue in the nation’s consciousness.  Groundwater supplies 
approximately ninety-six percent of the water in the United States.200  
Moreover, at least fifty percent “of the domestic water used in the 
United States is derived from groundwater.”201  In some areas, 
populations are one hundred percent reliant on groundwater.202  Thus, 
groundwater is one of the nation’s most precious natural resources. 
Opponents to the extension of the public trust doctrine assert 
that the traditional application of the public trust doctrine extended 
only to surface water;203 however, advances in science and technology 
demonstrate that there is a significant interrelationship between 
ground and surface water.204  It follows from this fact and basic 
hydrogeologic concepts that contamination of surface water can 
ultimately lead to the contamination of groundwater.205  This 
understanding, coupled with the knowledge that the preservation of 
groundwater has become crucial to the survival of our communities, 
has paved the way for groundwater’s inclusion within the bounds of 
the public trust doctrine.206 
Additionally, it can be argued that the reason the public trust was 
first applied to navigable waters, to foster the development of early 
American settlements, is precisely the same reason that the public 
trust doctrine should now encompass the protection of groundwater.  
Because the public trust doctrine “should not be considered fixed or 
static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing 
 
 199. See Kanner, supra note 9, at 83.. 
 200. Albert P. Barker & Richard B. Burleigh, Agricultural Chemicals and Groundwater 
Protection: Navigating the Complex Web of Regulatory Controls, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 443, 449 
(1994). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Blake Johnston et al., Groundwater in the West, 8 U. DENV. WATER  L. REV. 328, 335 
(2004). 
 203. Kanner, supra note 9, at 83. 
 204. Id. at 83, 85-86. 
 205. Id. at 85. 
 206. See Id. at 84-86. 
03__KANNER_ZIEGLER.DOC 2/6/2007  4:57 PM 
Fall 2006] NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE 155 
conditions and the needs of the public it was created to benefit,”207 the 
scope of the doctrine should remain broad and should extend to all 
resources that provide some benefit to the public, especially when 
basic human survival is dependent on such a resource. 
6. Government Contractor Defense 
One of the greatest ironies when considering NRD is the fact 
that pollution frequently emanates from facilities that provide 
services or products that have significant value or are necessary to our 
society for purposes of economics and development.  The pollution 
associated with these products or services may be characterized by 
polluters as a sort of “necessary evil.”208  Indeed, some of these 
services and products required by the general public are also required 
by the government.  A government’s need for such products or 
services is especially critical, for example, when the country is 
engaged in a war.  Furthermore, it has often been the case that such 
products and services are commissioned or rationed expressly by the 
government for use by the military during such times. 
When the government has requisitioned services or products 
from a defendant, a defendant might assert a government contractor 
defense to liability stemming from actions related to the provision of 
these services or products.209  This defense is based on the notion that 
when a PRP is compelled to provide services or products for the 
United States, any injury or damage arising as a result of performance 
of that obligation is excusable.  The government contractor defense is 
 
 207. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). 
 208. This characterization of pollution provokes the question whether the evil was truly 
unavoidable or necessary.  There is a predisposition to assume that polluters “did not know any 
better” when polluting the environment prior to the enactment of environmental regulations.  
The reality, however, is that the notion of “necessary evil” cannot be taken at face value.  
Polluters must be held accountable for all of their actions, whether environmental regulations 
existed at the time of pollution or not. 
 209. Courts have held that this is not a viable third party defense with respect to CERCLA.  
See, e.g.,, United States v. Shell Oil Co., 1992 WL 144296, No. CV. 91-0589-RJK, at *10 (C.D. 
Cal. Jan. 16, 1992).  In Shell, the oil company defendants argued “that plaintiffs are not entitled 
to recover because defendants’ actions were undertaken pursuant to contracts between them 
and the United States.”  The court responded: 
 . . .42 U.S.C. § 9620 addresses the issues of government contractor liability in the 
CERCLA context.  It provides that nothing in this section shall be construed to affect 
the liability of any person or entity under sections 9606 and 9607 . . . . In light of § 9620 
and the strict liability language of § 107, this affirmative defense is inappropriate and 
inconsistent with the third-party defense provided within § 107.  As such, it is 
dismissed. 
Id. 
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a matter of federal common law which displaces state law. Because 
federal procurement actively implicates ‘uniquely federal interests’ 
in ‘getting the Government’s work done,’ when the three 
referenced elements are present, state tort law significantly 
conflicts with federal interests and federal common law preempts it, 
providing a complete defense against state law claims.210 
In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the United States 
Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the application of the 
government contractor defense.211  There, a wrongful death suit was 
brought against an independent contractor who manufactured the 
helicopter and faulty escape-hatch system that ultimately resulted in a 
navy pilot’s death after the helicopter crashed off the coast of 
Virginia.212  The Court recognized the potential conflict between 
federal interests and state tort law with respect to government 
procurement contracts.213  The court examined the government 
contractor defense in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”),214 which is a consent to suit against the United States for 
the negligent or wrongful conduct of government employees, except 
as to those claims that are “based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty 
on the part of the federal agency or an employee of the Government, 
whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”215  Accordingly, 
government contractors are not subject to liability “when (1) the 
United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the 
equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier 
warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the 
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United 
States.”216 
Perhaps the most significant requirement of this three part test in 
the context of NRD actions is the United States’ approval of 
“reasonably precise specifications.”  The United States Supreme 
Court discussed the discretionary function exception in Berkovitz v. 
United States: 
 
 210. Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Md. 1997) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504, 512 (1988)). 
 211. 487 U.S. 500, 503-14 (1988). 
 212. Id. at 502-03. 
 213. Id. at 511. 
 214. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000). 
 215. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000)). 
 216. 487 U.S. at 512. 
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In examining the nature of the challenged conduct, a court must 
first consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting 
employee.  This inquiry is mandated by the language of the 
exception; conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an 
element of judgment or choice. . . . Thus, the discretionary function 
exception will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or 
policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to 
follow.  In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to 
adhere to the directive.  And if the employee’s conduct cannot 
appropriately be the product of judgment or choice, then there is 
no discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function 
exception to protect. 
. . . The exception, properly construed, therefore protects only 
governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of 
public policy. . . . In sum, the discretionary function exception 
insulates the Government from liability if the action challenged in 
the case involves the permissible exercise of policy judgment.217 
Thus, for the government contractor defense to apply, the 
government must have made a decision relating to the conduct at 
issue; that is, the government must have exercised a discretionary 
function. 
Courts have consistently held in environmental contamination 
cases where a defendant is asserting a government contractor defense 
that the United States never manifested the requisite approval of the 
manner and type of waste disposal activities that were responsible for 
the contamination of natural resources.218 
In Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., property 
owners brought a suit against a gaseous diffusion plant to recover for 
environmental damages caused by discharges of pollutants into the 
atmosphere, soil, bodies of water, and ditches at the plant.219  The 
defendants moved for summary judgment based on its relationship 
with the United States as a government contractor.220  The defendants 
 
 217. 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988). 
 218. Chris M. Amantea, The Growth of Environmental Issues in Government Contracting, 
43. AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1612-13 (1994) (“Government contractors cannot look to sovereign 
immunity to shield them from environmental liabilities. Although the “government contractor 
defense” may provide some protection in this regard, typically this defense is used successfully 
only against tort and product liability claims”(citing Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint 
Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing historical use of defense in cases where military 
personnel sued military contractors in product liability cases); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 
556, 567 (5th Cir. 1985) (providing that basis for government contractor defense in products 
liability action lies in federal common law); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 252 
(3d Cir. 1982) (holding government contractor defense is available in strict liability cases). 
 219. 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993). 
 220. Id. at 961-62. 
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argued that the Department of Energy (“DOE”) exercised 
substantial control over operations at the facilities, and therefore all 
activities fell within the discretionary function exception.221  In 
denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court 
held that “[t]he defendants have failed to present specific evidence 
regarding the directions and orders that the DOE gave with respect 
to waste management units at the plant.”222  Therefore, the defendants 
did not satisfy the first element of the government contractor defense 
by demonstrating that the pollution resulted from express approval 
and direction of the government. 
In Arness v. Boeing North American, Inc., the plaintiffs filed suit 
against the defendant asserting violations of state environmental laws 
stemming from the release and disposal of trichloroethylene (“TCE”) 
which contaminated the groundwater, soil and subsurface soil of the 
area surrounding a facility which manufactured and tested rocket 
engines.223  The defendant argued that the contamination resulted 
from rocket engine contracts that were performed pursuant to the 
specific direction and control of the United States.224  The defendant 
argued that the United States had specifically required the use of 
TCE.225  The court ultimately determined that the defendant failed to 
prove that he was “acting under” the direction of a federal officer, 
stating, 
[The Defendant’s] use of TCE did not cause Plaintiffs’ injuries.  
Rather, Plaintiffs’ injuries were allegedly caused by [Defendant]’s 
negligent disposal and storage of TCE, which activities were not 
performed at the government’s behest.  In fact, [the Defendant] 
declares that. . . “[t]he government did not specify safeguards to 
prevent the release of TCE to the air and ground in these flushing 
 
 221. Id. at 966. 
 222. Id. at 968. 
 223. 997 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1998) (order granting motion to remand).  In 
Arness, the court examined the issue of governmental direction and control in light of 
defendants’ removal of the case pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 
1442(a)(1) (2000), which states that an action filed against “[t]he United States or any agency 
thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any 
agency thereof, sued in an official capacity for any act under color of such office or on account 
of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress” may be removed to federal 
court.  Although the court did not expressly address the likelihood that the defendant’s 
government contractor defense would actually succeed in light of the facts, the reasoning used 
by the court is parallel to that which a court would use to examine the discretionary function 
exception when considering the applicability of the government contractor defense.  See id. at 
1272-75. 
 224. Id. at 1272. 
 225. Id. 
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procedures.” . . . Furthermore, . . .[the Defendant] does not submit 
any evidence that the government required . . .[the Defendant] to 
store the TCE in a particular manner which resulted in the alleged 
release of TCE that caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.226 
In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., the State of New Jersey filed an NRD action in 
New Jersey state court against ExxonMobil for contamination 
resulting from refinery operations, alleging violations of the New 
Jersey Spill Act and common law nuisance and trespass claims. 227  
Defendant ExxonMobil Corporation removed the case to federal 
court, arguing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, asserting the 
government contractor defense.228  The court remanded the case, 
stating with regard to the government contractor defense that “it is 
not entirely clear that this defense, which sounds in products liability, 
would apply here, to an issue turning on the construction of state 
environmental law.”229  In addition, the court stated that 
ExxonMobil’s claim that the Petroleum Administration for War 
exerted control over “the manufacture, production, storage, and 
transfer of petroleum products” failed to establish the government’s 
control over improper waste disposal methods, the action causing the 
injury of which the plaintiffs complained.230 
As demonstrated by the reasoning of the courts in the 
aforementioned cases, a defendant must provide specific evidence 
demonstrating that any discharges or improper waste disposal 
occurred with the express approval and direction of the federal 
government to satisfy the first prong of the requirements of the 
government contractor defense.  Given the historic overall lack of 
success defendants have had with such a defense in environmental 
 
 226. Id. at 1274-75.  Similarly, in Bahrs v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 795 F. Supp. 965 (D. Ariz. 
1992), the defendant attempted to invoke federal jurisdiction by arguing it had acted under the 
direction of federal government when disposing of waste products that led to the contamination 
of the plaintiffs’ water supply.  The court held that “[w]hile the government officials were 
undoubtedly most interested in the production of war materials, the record before this Court 
does not demonstrate the government’s necessary control over the method of waste disposal.  
The mere fact that the government possessed the power to exercise control over the project 
does not establish that the power was ever in fact exercised.”  Id. at 970. 
 227.  No. Hud-L 4415-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 18, 2004). 
 228. Notice of Removal at § 1.20, New Jersey Dep’t  of Envtl.  Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 
No. Hud-L 4415-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 18, 2004). 
 229. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp. 381 F.Supp. 2d 398, 404, (D.N.J. 
2005). 
 230. Id. at 8. 
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contamination cases, it is unlikely that it will succeed in future NRD 
cases. 
A key consideration in this type of defense is absolute joint and 
several liability - it is ultimately irrelevant if a portion of NRD 
occurred during war.  Furthermore, if a defendant raises this type of 
defense, he ultimately bears the burden of proof as to the degree of 
his contribution to the contamination. 
7. Statutory Immunity 
Along the same lines as the government contractor defense, 
defendants may also assert defenses based on immunity provisions 
found in certain federal statutes regarding government contracts.  The 
Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”), contains immunity 
provisions for defendant contractors performing contracts entered 
into pursuant to those statutes.  The “DPA” states in relevant part: 
“No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties for any act or 
failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance with a 
rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to this Act . . . .”231  For 
purposes of this analysis, the application of DPA immunity will be 
examined in the context of the numerous “Agent Orange” suits. 
In Ryan v. Dow Chemical Co., civilians in Vietnam filed a suit 
against “Agent Orange” manufacturers, claiming injuries resulting 
from exposure to the chemical defoliant.232  The defendants argued 
that the case should be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442, 
asserting the government contractor defense and immunity under the 
DPA.233  Although the court ruled that the DPA was a “colorable” 
defense for purposes of removal, the court questioned the validity of 
such claims of immunity, stating, 
There is a dispute as to whether section 707 [of the DPA] provides 
immunity against tort suits based in strict liability and negligence of 
the sort the civilian plaintiffs wish to pursue.  On a previous 
occasion, this court was inclined to view section 707 as immunizing 
contractors only for contract damages, although it did not rule on 
the issue.234 
The “previous occasion” referenced by the Ryan court was the 
Eastern District of New York’s decision in In re “Agent Orange” 
Product Liability Litigation, in which the defendant manufacturers 
 
 231. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2157. 
 232. 781 F. Supp. 934, 936 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 233. Id. at 938. 
 234. Id. at 945. 
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argued that, under the DPA, they should not be held liable for 
complying with “Agent Orange” production contracts entered into 
with the United States government.235  As noted in Ryan, the Agent 
Orange court held that immunity under the DPA did not necessarily 
extend to liability for torts: 
It is indisputable that the statutory ancestors of section 707 only 
immunized contractors from liability for breach of contract 
damages; the law was explicit on that point. 
It is telling that neither the Defense Production Act itself nor the 
legislative history made any reference to tort claims despite the fact 
that, as evidenced by this suit, the contracts “rated” under the Act 
“involve items, the production of which may . . . giv[e] rise to the 
possibility of an enormous amount of claims.”236 
If section 707 is to be applied to tort claims at all, it should only be 
read to bar claims for strict liability, not negligence.  The former 
involve holding a defendant liable despite the fact that it may not 
have been at fault and the liability thus truly “result[s] . . . from 
compliance with . . . this Act.”  Whether this last interpretation or 
one not applying section 707 to tort suits altogether is adopted, the 
Defense Production Act would not bar plaintiffs’ claims.237 
Similarly, in Hercules, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit examined the scope of immunity of section 707 
of the DPA.238  In Hercules, manufacturers sued the United States 
government to recover expenses incurred as a result of Agent Orange 
litigation.239  The defendants argued that because the government had 
compelled them to enter into contracts for the production of “Agent 
Orange” pursuant to section 101 of the DPA, the defendants were 
entitled to immunity under section 707 for both contract and tort 
suits.240  The court disagreed, stating: 
The language of section 101(a) makes it clear that the purpose of 
the statute is to authorize the President to dictate that preference 
be given the government contracts which are necessary to promote 
the national defense. . . . Significantly, section 101(a) does not 
mention either the specific nature of performance under a DPA 
contract, or the subsequent use of goods produced under such a 
contract.  Therefore, we conclude that, while the risk imposed by 
 
 235. 597 F. Supp. 740, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2nd Cir. 1987). 
 236. Id. at 845 (quoting S. REP. NO. 85-2281, reprinted at 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4043, 4045 
(1958)). 
 237. Id. (quoting section 707 of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2157). 
 238. 24 F.3d 188 (Fed. Cir. 1994), aff’d, 516 U.S. 417 (1996). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 202-203 (noting that 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a)(1964) authorizes the President “to 
compel contract performance as well as contract acceptance”). 
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section 101(a) does include the possible need of a contractor to 
break its contracts with third parties in order to give preference to a 
DPA contract, it does not include the risk that the product 
produced under the DPA contract will be inherently unsafe to 
users.241 
Consistent with the court’s reasoning in In re Agent Orange, 
immunity under the DPA would not apply to defendants who 
improperly dispose of waste or discharge hazardous substances 
despite the existence of a contract with the government.  Unless a 
contract with the government explicitly directs and authorizes the 
waste disposal and discharge methods to be undertaken by a 
defendant, it is difficult to see how the DPA can successfully be 
asserted as a defense to liability for NRD. 
8. Standing to Bring NRD Claims 
Defendants may also contend that the state does not have 
sufficient standing to bring NRD claims.  In Department of 
Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power and Light Co., the 
State of New Jersey filed suit against a public utility engaged in the 
operation of a nuclear power plant. 242  The court held that the state, 
seeking to recover damages as parens patriae for damage to fisheries 
caused by the defendant’s cooling water discharges during plant 
operations, had standing to seek both an injunction and damages.243 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the state did 
not have a proprietary right to the fish in its waters sufficient to 
support an action for damages.244  Affirming the judgment of the 
lower court, the court stated that the State of New Jersey has “not 
only the right but also the affirmative fiduciary obligation to ensure 
that the rights of the public to a viable marine environment are 
protected, and to seek compensation for any diminution in the trust 
corpus.’”245  The court further said that “absent some special interest 
in some private citizen, it was questionable whether anyone but the 
state could be considered the proper party to sue for recovery of 
damages to the environment.”246 
 
 241. Id. at 203. 
 242. 336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), aff’d., 336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976). 
 243. Id. at 759. 
 244. Id. at 758759. 
 245. Id. at 759 (quoting Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. V. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 
671, 674 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973). 
 246. Id. 
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Some defendants have even gone so far as to question a state’s 
inherent right to protect its natural resources as a public trustee.  In 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. ExxonMobil 
Corp., the defendant made the following argument: 
State ownership of natural resources derives from the sovereign 
rights of the British Crown and of the United States, and is 
governed by federal law, since under the equal footing doctrine 
these rights must be the same in all states.  Plaintiffs’ expansive 
theories of natural resource ownership and damages go beyond the 
sovereign rights transmitted to New Jersey by the British Crown at 
independence in 1776, and would offend the equal footing doctrine 
if they were upheld.247 
ExxonMobil essentially argued that New Jersey exceeded its 
authority by attempting to bring NRD claims pursuant to the New 
Jersey Spill Act and common law.  This case is currently pending in 
New Jersey state court.  Given New Jersey’s historical pattern of 
upholding the State’s authority to bring NRD claims, it is unlikely this 
defense will be successful. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The preservation, protection, and reclamation of natural 
resources have become increasingly more important as the 
devastating impact of contamination is revealed.  The multiplying 
number of NRD cases that are filed each year serves as a testament to 
this fact.  The process of resolving these cases will force the courts 
and litigants to take a hard look at the available universe of 
approaches.  Because of the highly specific nature of each NRD case, 
the manner of application and the success of these claims will only be 
realized over time as NRD is examined on a case by case basis. 
 
 247. Notice of Removal at 1.20(e), New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 
No. Hud-L 4415-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 18, 2004). 
